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ABSTRACT 
In recent years there has been considerable interest in organizational decision 
making viewed as a political process. Although there is now a substantial body of 
literature devoted to this theme, however, much of it is rather vague and lacking in 
specificity as to the nature and elements of the political process. It also remains 
largely unconnected to the literatures on cognitive, cultural, and other social and 
psychological perspectives on the decision making process. In this paper we draw on 
an in-depth study of decision making in the British nuclear power reactor 
development program to explore the detailed anatomy of the politics of decision 
making, and to indicate its linkages with cognitive, cultural and other related 
elements. 
1 
Political perspectives on ornanizational 
decision making 
The idea of analyzing the organization and 
its decision making processes from a 
political perspective goes back at least to 
Crozier’s (1964) study of bureaucracy. 
Championed through the 1970s by 
Pettigrew and Pfeffer, it has found 
increasing support in the last decade. 
Following the work of Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1974) on the politics of university budget 
decision making, Pfeffer (1981) has given a 
detailed and thorough analysis of the 
sources and uses of power in organiza- 
tions. In a series of in-depth longitudinal 
case studies of organizational change 
processes, Pettigrew (1973, 1977, 1985, and 
Mumford & Pettigrew, 1975) has repeatedly 
emphasized the political nature of both 
organizational decision making and the 
related implementation process. 
Elsewhere Farrell and Peterson (1982), 
Gray and Ariss (1985), and Mintzberg 
(1985) have all emphasized the through and 
through political nature of organizations. 
Fahey (1981) has observed that strategic 
management decision processes are 
characterized by a high degree of political 
activity. And Kotter (1986) has argued that 
the development and use of political power 
is the central function of management. 
Hickson and others (1986), in a large scale 
study of 150 decision making case 
histories, have again highlighted political 
activity as one of the central features of 
the observed processes, and this conclusion 
has also been drawn from a diverse range 
of case studies by Welsh and Slusher 
(1986), Wilson (1982), Graham (1986), and 
Hendry (1988). 
Focusing on the implementation of 
strategic change, Greiner (1986) has noted 
the importance of top management politics 
in determining the feasibility or otherwise 
of proposed change processes, while Guth 
and Macmillan (1986) have drawn attention 
to the power of middle managers not only 
to delay, mitigate or redirect implementa- 
tion processes, but to sabotage them 
altogether. 
The departmental politics of strategic 
decision making, and in particular the 
sources of departmental power, have been 
analyzed by Hambrick (1981) and Jemison 
(1981, 1984), while MacKenzie (1986) has 
analyzed the exercise of power through 
committees. Narayonan and Fahey (1982) 
and Nielsen and Rao (1987) have analyzed 
the emergence of power in dominant 
coalitions. 
A political perspective is also implicit in 
the literature on innovation champions and 
the implementation of new technologies 
(Schon, 1963; Chakrabarti, 1974; Roberts, 
1968, Leonard-Barton and Kraus (1985); 
Quinn and Mueller, 1963; Burgelman, 1983), 
and in that on inter-departmental conflict, 
especially n the context of product 
innovation (Gupta and others, 1985, 1988; 
Souder, 1987, 1988; Walton and Dutton, 
1969; Seiler, 1963, LaPorte, 1967; Lawrence 
and Lorsch, 1967; Rubinstein and others, 
1976; Souder and Chakrabarti, 1980). 
Finally, two major process studies of 
strategic change, while themselves 
emphasizing the rationality of the 
processes observed, have also served to 
confirm their political nature. Drawing on 
the longitudinal case studies of Miller and 
Friesen (1980, 1984), in which strategic 
change decisions were observed to 
occurring revolutionary clusters inter- 
spersed by long evolutionary periods of 
incremental change, Mintzberg (1987, and 
Mintzberg and McHugh, 1985) described 
the incremental phase of development in 
overtly political terms, with the decision 
makers managing a continuous series of 
emergent potential strategies. Building on 
this work, but more especially on Quinn’s 
(1980) in-depth study of the strategic 
decision process, again characterized by 
incrementalism, and on his own in-depth 
study of the strategic process in a single 
firm, Johnson (1987, 1988) again 
emphasized the political nature of the 
decision making process. 
There can be little doubt, in the light of 
this literature, that the political 
perspective on organizations and their 
decision making processes is an important 
one. If it is to be operationalized so as to 
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be useful as well, however, it needs to be 
expressed in terms of clear frameworks of 
analysis, and there has so far been 
relatively little progress in this direction. 
The studies of particular aspects of the 
politics of organizational decision making 
do not share any common framework. And 
much of the more general work has been 
distinctly vague, as the writers have been 
content to point out, or sometimes merely 
to imply, the political nature of the 
process being described without any 
detailed analysis of the how the political 
activity arises or what form it takes. 
Only Pfeffer (1981) has attempted a 
comprehensive analysis, and though 
illustrated by empirical case studies this 
remains a predominantly theoretical study. 
Despite Pfeffer’s own call for further 
empirical work to test and fill out his own 
provisional conclusions, moreover, his 
framework has remained virtually untested 
and indeed unused by more recent studies. 
In a recent detailed study of organization- 
al decision making in the British nuclear 
power development programme in the 
195Os, however, Hendry (1988) highlighted 
the political nature of the decision making 
process observed and analyzed it in terms 
of the elements of political context and of 
political activity. In this paper we shall 
summarize that analysis and compare and 
combine it both with the framework 
provided by Pfeffer and with the more 
specific insights of some of the other 
writers in the field. 
Cognitive. cultural. and grotto psvcholony 
persnectives 
A second weakness of the literature on 
organizational politics is that it is almost 
entirely unconnected to the other 
substantial bodies of research that have 
been developed, as it has, in qualification 
of or opposition to the traditional rational 
(whether synoptic or incrementalist) 
interpretations of decision making. 
Interest in the cognitive aspects of 
decision making can be traced back to the 
pioneering work of Simon (1947, and 
March and Simon, 1958) and Lindblum 
(1959) on satisficing and “muddling 
through”. Noting the human impossibility 
of a comprehensive analysis of a complex 
problem in which all possibly relevant 
information was absorbed and processed, 
both authors emphasised the importance of 
the sequential comparison of limited 
alternatives in the decision making 
process. Simon also noted the use of 
established repertoires as alternatives for 
choice in familiar situations, and the 
tendency for decision makers to 
concentrate on the discovery of satisfac- 
tory alternatives, rather than searching for 
optimal ones. 
In recent years there has been a renewed 
surge of interest in such cognitive 
influences on decision making. Gioia and 
Poole (1984) and Lord and Kernan (1987) 
have applied script theory (Schank and 
Abelson, 1977) to an organizational setting, 
describing how familiar or conventional 
stimuli are interpreted not as what they 
are but in terms of the inferred scripts or 
sequences of events with which they are 
habitually associated. Dutton and Jackson 
(1987) have drawn on cognitive categoriza- 
tion theory (Rosch and Lloyd, 1978) to 
show how the complexity of the stimuli 
with which decision makers are bombarded 
is handled by a cognitive process of 
selection and grouping in terms of 
meaningful labels. Kiesler and Sproull 
(1982) have explored the characteristics 
and fallacies of managers’ environmental 
analyses predicted by social cognition 
theories. And Schwenk (1984) and Duhaime 
and Schwenk (1985) have also discussed 
the use of such cognitive simplifying 
processes in strategic decision making in 
general and the making of acquisition and 
disposal conditions in particular. Grinyer 
and Spender (1979), Huff (1982) and 
Johnson (1986) have highlighted the use of 
simplified frameworks for decision making 
in the form of industry or firm “recipes”. 
Building on a literature on the psychology 
of decision making under risk (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979; Payne and others, 1980, 1891), Crum 
and Derkinderen (1986) have drawn 
attention to the universal tendencies to 
either ignore or overestimate the 
? 
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probability of very unlikely events, and to 
overvalue the elimination of small risks as 
against the lessening of large ones, in the 
strategic decision making context. Barnes 
(1984) has also explored a variety of 
cognitive biases on risk evaluation. 
The effect of these cognitive influences on 
strategic decision making appears to be 
particularly marked when perceptions of 
risk interact with the use of categories. 
Dutton (1986) has drawn attention to the 
way issues perceived as “crisis” or “non- 
crisis” issues are handled in very different 
ways by decision making teams, and 
Dutton and Jackson (1987) have explored 
the strategy-making implications of the 
cognitive categories of “threat” and 
“opportunity”. Crum and Derkinderen 
(1986) have noted that decision makers 
tend to be more concerned about negative 
than about positive outcomes of their 
decisions, and have analyzed their 
tendency to avoid risks when seeking gains 
(opportunity behaviour) but accept them 
when seeking to avoid losses (threat 
behaviour), distinguishing in the latter 
case between the “losses” associated with 
accepted failure and the “costs” associated 
with an ongoing but as yet unresolved 
failure. A number of writers have also 
noted the tendency toward risk-seeking 
behaviour when faced with the perception 
of losses (Staw and Ross, 1978; Fox and 
Staw, 1979; Staw, 1981; Bowman, 1982; 
Brockner and others, 1986; Whyte, 1986). 
If cognitive effects on decision making 
were universal, then in some sense they 
would provide no real challenge to the 
traditional rational view of strategic 
decision making. But they are not of 
course. Quite apart from the fact that 
people may to some extent overcome the 
limitations by being aware of them, there 
are also important personal differences. In 
the context of risk behaviour, Brockner 
and others (1986) have analyzed the 
process of entrapment, by which people 
become increasingly committed to a failing 
or ineffective course of action, in terms of 
the relationship between different types of 
feedback and personal self-identity. And 
Greenberger and Strasser (1986), analyzing 
people’s need to maximise their perceived 
control over the environment and their 
tendency to seek to continue balancing 
their perceptions even when the reality 
diverges from them, have noted the 
importance of this need in influencing 
decision making behaviour. 
More generally, Hambrick and Mason 
(1984) have noted the influence of age on 
strategic choices. Guth and Tagiuki (1965) 
have stressed the immense importance of 
personal values as determinants of 
strategy. And Kets de Vries and Miller 
(1984) have identified the neurotic styles 
of top executives as important deter- 
minants of their strategic choices. Mitroff 
(1983) has developed the Jungian notion of 
archetypes to explore how decision makers 
are influenced by the social images they 
create of themselves, their institutions and 
their environments. Building on a tradition 
of laboratory based psychological 
categorization, Henderson and Nutt (1980) 
have used Meyers-Briggs indicators 
(themselves based on Jungian categories) 
to link decision makers’ behaviour with 
cognitive style. And Taggart and others 
(1981, 1985) have expanded this approach 
to embrace a range of cognitive measures 
correlated in terms of EEC readings. 
Strategic decision making is also subject 
to cultural influences, and while the 
literature on this is often unspecific it is 
nevertheless compelling. At the broadest 
level Hayes and Abernathy (1980) draw 
attention to the pervasive influence of 
American managerial ideals and what they 
term the gospels of pseudo-professionalism 
on what is considered important in the 
strategy making process, how this process 
is conducted and what kinds of decisions 
are made. Argyris (1983) argues that 
people are socialised in early life to 
reason in ways that may be appropriate 
for relatively simple problem-solving but 
are counterproductive for solving the 
complex, difficult and threatening problems 
characteristic of strategic decision making; 
and that unaware of this they create 
organizational conditions that inhibit 
effective decision making, and organiza- 
tional cultures which reinforce and 
perpetuate these conditions. 
At the level of individual corporations, 
Thompson and Wildavsky (1986), drawing 
on the work of the anthropologist Mary 
Douglas (1973), present a typology of 
organizational cultures, each associated 
with a characteristic style of information 
processing and decision making. Gunz and 
Whitley (1985) use case studies to 
illustrate the effect of corporate culture 
on the response to external economic 
stimuli. And Daft and Weick (1984) explore 
how an organizations intrusiveness in 
respect of its environment and the social 
assumptions it makes about its environment 
affect its strategic decision making. 
While developing a typology of organiza- 
tions , Thompson and Wildavsky also stress 
that each organization should itself be 
seen as a pattern of suborganizations with 
contradicting organizational cultures, and 
the notion of a unified corporate culture, 
so pervasive of the popular literature, is 
also challenged strongly by others. 
Gregory (1983), Riley (1983) and van 
Maanen and Barley (1985) all argue from 
empirical evidence that organizations 
should be seen as systems of multiple 
integrated subcultures, and this reinforces 
the point made by Dean (1974), Hayes and 
Abernathy (1984), Jemison (1981, 1984), 
and Hambrick and Mason (1984) that 
different subunits of the organization also 
exert cultural influences on strategic 
choice. Functional departments in 
particular are characterised by different 
values, time horizons, and perceptions of 
relative importance, and also reflect the 
different cultural environments with which 
they interact. Depending on the relative 
dominance of the functions in the culture 
and politics of the firm, these subcultural 
characteristics will be reflected in varying 
proportions in the strategic decision 
making process. 
Perhaps the most thorough analysis of the 
corporate culture and its effect on 
decision making processes is that provided 
by Schein (1985), who also demonstrated 
how cultural phenomena arise out of group 
phenomena. And other writers too have 
indicated how decision making is 
conditioned by group effects. Janis (1972) 
and Janis and Mann (1977) have made a 
strong case for a conflict theory of 
decision making in which the process is ,.; 
directed primarily by participants’ ,, ~_ I“” 
responses to the stress generated by the 
decisional conflicts that arise in any 
difficult and consequential decision 
situations. In individuals these responses 
include problem avoidance and paralyzing 
hyper-vigilance. In groups they result in 
the phenomenon of “groupthink”, in which 
retaining the approval of other members of 
the team becomes more important than 
finding a good solution to the problem in 
hand. Weick (1969) also notes the tendency 
of organizations to be solution rather than 
problem oriented, accepting any solution 
rather than looking for the best one, and 
Schweigger and others (1986) have 
reinforced the importance of this 
conclusion. In a series of laboratory tests 
they found that decisions achieved by 
consensus and characterized by the 
satisfaction and agreement of the decision 
makers and their willingness to continue 
working as a team were of poorer quality 
than those characterized by argument and 
dissent. 
Given this wide variety of cognitive, 
cultural and behavioural influences on the 
strategic decision making process, and 
given too that decision makers are not 
generally aware, or at least fully aware, of 
the influences (as Isenberg (1984) points 
out, senior managers tend to respond 
intuitively as well as rationally to problem 
situations), one might expect that the 
decision making process itself would be 
characterized by the non-rational 
resolution of conflicting influences: that it 
would, in other words, be a political 
process. In fact, however, the political 
literature makes virtually no reference to 
the cognitive, cultural and group effects 
referred to here, no do writers on these 
effects make any connection between their 
own work and. that on the politics of 
decision making. Where the different 
approaches are discussed in the same 
breath (e.g. Johnson, 1987; Morgan, 1986), 
the implication is that they represent 
alternative viewpoints, which may perhaps 
be usefully superposed, but which are 
effectively independent. 
On the basis of our case study we shall 
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however argue here that the different 
approaches are intimately related. in 
particular we shall argue that the political 
process is dependent on the existence of 
certain cognitive, cultural and group 
effects, and that these effects require a 
degree of political activity for their 
resolution. 
The case history: nuclear power reactor 
development in Britain 
Between the end of the Second World War 
and 1959 the United Kingdom Atomic 
Energy Authority and its predecessor 
organization investigated seriously eleven 
different reactor designs as candidates for 
inclusion in the British civil nuclear power 
programme. One of these was the magnox 
reactor originally developed for military 
plutonium production which turned out to 
be a useful power producer as well and 
formed the basis of the first phase of the 
nuclear power programme. Of the 
remaining ten, six had already been 
rejected by 1959, including the pressurized 
water reactor (PWR) which formed the 
basis of the American programme, which 
had, for a substantial period in the mid- 
5Os, occupied pole position in the British 
programme, and which has since been 
reintroduced into the British programme at 
the expense of the AGR in the mid-80s. 
One was carried through to an experimen- 
tal reactor on a prolonged time scale as 
part of a European project, having been 
effectively rejected for the British 
programme. One was carried through to 
the prototype stage in the late 1960s as an 
insurance policy. The remaining two were 
effectively selected as future product lines 
and given development priority: the 
Advanced gas-cooled reactor (AGR), which 
duly became the mainstay of the power 
programme in the 1960s and 197Os, and the 
fast reactor, which remained until very 
recently the favoured approach to nuclear 
power development in the longer term. 
Although the continued rejection of the 
PWR design in the 1960s became a matter 
of national political debate (Williams, 
1980), these development decisions, which 
effectively determined the outcome of that 
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political debate, are generally portrayed as 
technical ones, based on a combination of 
technological and economic (corresponding 
in this context to market) factors. The 
AGR has always looked a strange choice 
on these criteria, however, and the choice 
of the fast reactor, beset by persistent 
safety and other development problems, 
has also looked increasingly open to 
question. The question addressed in the 
case study, therefore, was how the 
development decisions actually came about. 
The study was conducted as part of an 
officially sanctioned history of the 
UKAEA, and benefitted from full access to 
all archival and other documentation both 
in the organization itself and in related 
government departments. Because of the 
public nature of the body, this documenta- 
tion was extensive, and included 
correspondence, working reports and 
committee minutes at all levels of the 
decision making process. An extensive 
interview programme was also conducted. 
The results of the study, and the detailed 
analysis underlying the brief summary 
given here have been published in detail in 
a working paper (Hendry, 1988). The 
principal conclusion reached was that the 
decision making process observed had 
relatively little to do with either 
technology or economics, as would be 
expected on a purely rational interpreta- 
tion, or with any combination of these, 
but an awful lot to do with organizational 
politics. If we adopt Pfeffer’s definition of 
organizational politics as “involv[ing] those 
activities taken within organizations to 
acquire, develop, and use power and other 
resources to obtain one’s preferred 
outcomes in a situation in which there is 
uncertainty or dissensus about choices”, 
the decision making process was a process 
of organizational politics. It consisted 
primarily in a process of manoeuvreing and 
negotiation between individuals and 
interest groups, in which the wider 
interests of these individuals and groups 
and their overall power relationships were 
every bit as important as their views on 
the mater in question. 
The elements of this political process were 
many, but some of the main ones were 
easily isolated. They could be classified 
into elements of political context and 
elements of political activitv, and the 
former group could be further subdivided 
into elements of preference and elements 
of relationship. 
There were five apparent elements of 
preference. The first was of course an 
obiective technical element, which even 
when it was not dominant (and it was 
rarely dominant) was almost always present 
to some extent. Some options were quite 
simply technologically impossible, while 
others were of proven feasibility. Some 
options were clearly preferable to others 
either on technological or economic 
grounds or even on both together. One 
material, for example, may have had all 
the qualities of another one, with 
additional qualities as well, with fewer 
drawbacks and at a lower cost. In such 
circumstances decision making was usually 
fairly straightforward (though it was not 
always entirely free of more subjective 
elements), and much of the nuts and bolts 
decision making in the reactor development 
programme was predominantly of this kind. 
Even when there was a clear technological 
preference, however, there was no 
guarantee that this would correspond to an 
economic preference or vice versa, and 
while some technological alternatives could 
be reduced to economic considerations this 
was often not feasible in practice, even 
though it might be in principle. Moreover, 
in any reasonably complex design process 
the technological options did not usually 
lend themselves to objective choice. Each 
option had attractions incommensurable 
with those of its rivals; each had unknown 
properties and implications; each individual 
choice interacted with a host of others; 
and there were often ‘aesthetic and other 
design considerations too. The decision 
process therefore depended on a host of 
other subiective preferences, and these 
operated at personal, group, and divisional 
levels, as well as intruding from outside 
the organization altogether. 
The existence of strong personal 
preferences was amply evidenced in the 
case study, and it was clear also that such 
preferences were often strong enough to 
override substantial “objective” arguments 
against them. 
The case study also revealed the presence 
of grouu preferences. Almost all the 
reactor project teams developed strong 
preferences in favour of the reactor types 
on which they were working, while other 
groups such as a small policy department 
and a reactor safety group also developed 
distinctive sets of preferences. 
While small group effects were clearly 
observable in the case study, it was the 
larger scale cultural preferences of the 
divisions of the organization that appeared 
most dominant. In many contexts the 
preferences of the R&D, engineering, and 
where appropriate the headquarters 
administration divisions, could be almost 
guaranteed to differ, irrespective of the 
technical arguments to hand. 
Besides all these preferences internal to 
the organization, there were also important 
external nreferences. Like any organiza- 
tion, the UKAEA had external as well as 
internal stakeholders, or constituencies to 
which it was in varying ways responsible. 
And these stakeholders often had 
technological preferences that were only 
marginally related to the technological 
decision criteria used inside the organiza- 
tion. Private firms favoured the 
prosecution of whatever reactor projects 
they might themselves be able to 
participate in or benefit commercially 
from. Government preferences were 
strongly influenced by the political credit 
to be gained from alternative initiatives, 
and by such things as the possibilities for 
European collaboration. 
All these different types of preferences 
were elements of the political context of 
the decision making process, and so too 
were the different relationships in terms 
of which contrasts between preferences 
were organizationally embodied. 
Interpersonal relationships were clearly 
important, and took many forms. In many 
cases the conflicts arising from contrasting 
preferences could be resolved, but in 
others they could not. The conflicts 
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between some of the key R&D staff were 
never resolved nor even brought to the 
fore, but operated as a passive constraint 
on communication and debate. This 
severely limited the potential for the 
formulation and implementation of any 
coherent policy with significant repercus- 
sions on the ways in which the cultural 
preferences of the R&D division entered 
into the decision making process. Within 
the AGR design management team in the 
engineering division there were unresolved, 
open but repressed conflicts, which 
distorted all aspects of technological 
debate and severely limited the decision 
making procedures available to the team. 
Before the formation of the UKAEA 
(before which the atomic energy project 
had operated within the civil service), the 
conflict between the charismatic directors 
of the R&D and engineering divisions was 
largely of the passive type, but once they 
were forced into frequent contact through 
a committee system introduced with the 
new organization the conflict became open 
and active, again with important 
consequences for the decision making 
process. 
Finally the organizational handling of 
intergrouo and intercultural relationships 
was also important. In the case of the 
relationship between the R&D and 
engineering divisions, for example, the 
organizational structure resulted in the 
different preferences of the two divisions 
finding expression very largely in the 
dialogue between their leaders, in which it 
was compounded by their own interper- 
sonal conflict. Other groups, in contrast, 
were able to interact without encountering 
interpersonal problems, and in some cases 
there were even strong personal ties 
between rival interest groups. All this 
affected the ways in- which preferences 
were presented and debated, the processes 
by which decisions were reached, and the 
types of decisions that resulted. 
The elements listed above make up the 
political context of the decision making, 
but our the case study also revealed 
another set of elements relating this time 
to the political activity itself. These 
elements appeared to fall into two classes, 
one concerned with the process of decision 
making through committees, which in this 
particular study provided in principle the 
medium for all decision making; and the 
other concerned with the ways in which 
decisions were effectively made outside the 
committee context. 
Within the committees, two modes of 
decision making were apparent. In the top 
UKAEA committees, the model appears to 
have been that of political satisficinq. 
Faced with two rival experts and no real 
means of judging between them on 
technical grounds, the chairman tended to 
seek a decision pattern that would favour 
both sides equally, so that while neither 
was pleased with the result both could be 
satisfied. Where there was a clear weight 
of technical opinion he would attempt to 
incorporate it, but his main concern 
appears to have been that of coping with 
the politics rather than deciding on the 
technology. On the non-technological 
matters of defence and international 
relations with which he was primarily 
concerned as chairman, it should be said, 
his approach was much stronger and more 
issue-oriented, but the political element 
remained. Outside the top committees, in 
a technical programme committee, in 
various high level working parties and in 
the individual reactor development 
committees, the dominant approach to 
decision making was one of attemnted 
gntimization, in which the chairman 
sought, however vainly or however blindly, 
to analyze the complex of preferences of 
all kinds surrounding an issue and reach 
an objectively best technical decision. 
Of course, both these approaches lent 
themselves to manipulation, and it is that 
political maninulation which emerged from 
the study as one of the most significant 
elements of the political activity. The top 
management committees could be manipu- 
lated by the careful timing of proposals, 
and by the use of dummy proposals, and it 
WaS clear from the study that the 
engineering division in particular were 
masters of this art. Since they were 
convinced of their own position, and since 
there was nothing whatsoever to be said 
in favour of a decision dictated purely by 
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political compromise, this manipulation 
was, moreover, quite reasonable and 
arguably quite justifiable. Manipulation of 
the other committees could be and was 
achieved by the time-honoured practices of 
loading the committee with supporters, 
overloading it with evidence, the use of 
false or fictional authorities, and the 
timing of proposals to coincide with the 
natural peaks and troughs of project 
confidence. And both types of decision 
process were susceptible to the lobbying of 
apparently unbiased committee members to 
win their support. 
Outside the committee framework, two 
elements of political activity were 
particularly noticeable: the use of an 
effective veto, and the use of external 
influences. The use of external influences 
was practised most visibly by the director 
of the R&D division, whose connections in 
government and official circles were often 
more potent than his influence within the 
organization. No matter how much political 
control he could exert over his subor- 
dinates, the chairman could not easily 
resist a request from the Prime Minister 
or the Foreign Office. The use of an 
effective veto, on the other hand, was the 
main weapon of the director of the 
engineering division, and of all the 
elements of political activity observed it 
was probably the most potent. In the end 
decisions tended to go the way of the 
engineering division for the very simple 
reason that there was no means of forcing 
them to undertake a project they did not 
wish to. And by concentrating their 
political activity on establishing and 
maintaining their responsibility for the 
most advanced stages of any reactor 
development project they were able to 
ensure that all such projects could, if they 
wished, be abandoned. 
The sources and elements of the politicd 
DrOceSS 
The case study analysis was intentionally 
conducted without reference to any 
theoretical framework for the analysis of 
political activity in organizations, and the 
framework outlined above was in fact 
developed before the author had met with 
the work of Pfeffer (1981). It is clear, 
however, that Pfeffer’s analysis of the 
sources, strategies and tactics of power in 
organizations could have been applied to 
the case study. 
As sources of power, Pfeffer lists resource 
provision, uncertainty coping, being 
irreplaceable, being in a position to affect 
the premises, agenda or information input 
to the decision making process, represent- 
ing a consensus, and possessing political 
skills. As indicated in table 1, all these 
sources were encountered in the case 
study. 
Similarly with strategies and tactics, 
Pfeffer lists the selective use of objective 
criteria, the use of an outside expert, 
controlling agendas, forming coalitions, 
whether internally or externally to the 
organization, the use of committees, and 
the use of cooptation to influence the 
positions of key actors. Again, as indicated 
in table 2, all these could be observed in 
the case study. 
Whilst confirming the elements of Pfeffer’s 
analysis, however, the study also suggests 
some modifications to it. In respect of the 
sources of power, control over the 
boundaries of the organization, identified 
by Hambrick (1981) and Jemison (1981, 
1984) as a key source of departmental 
power in organizations, was also important 
in the context of the case study. Its 
effects were not explicitly prominent, but 
it was clearly highly valued by the 
divisions, each of which sought control 
over channels of communication with 
industry, the electricity authorities, raw 
materials suppliers, and government. 
In respect of the strategies and tactics of 
power, the use of an effective power of 
veto, or more generally of the power of 
non-cooperation, emerged from the case 
study as by far the most significant and 
effective tactic or strategy. This 
observation is mirrored, moreover, in one 
of the few other case studies of 
organizational decision making to have 
been carried out in comparable depth, that 
by Graham (1986) on RCA’s videodisc 
development. 
Finally, and in our view crucially, Pfeffer’s 
framework contains nothing corresponding 
to our “elements of political context”. This 
is partly because Pfeffer’s focus is on 
power rather than on politics, and partly 
perhaps because the context is taken for 
granted. But a clear statement of the 
elements of context is in our view 
essential if we are to arrive at a clear and 
useful framework for the analysis of the 
political process in organizations. The 
political process depends upon the 
existence of political units, be they 
individuals, groups or cultures, with 
differing sets of preferences. It also 
depends on how these units are organiza- 
tionally related to each other. Only after 
we have identified the units, their 
preference differences and their relation- 
ships, can we begin to analyze how the 
differences are resolved in terms of the 
sources, strategies and tactics of power. It 
therefore seems worthwhile bringing 
together Pfeffer’s framework, with the 
modifications suggested above, with the 
appropriate aspects of the framework 
developed in our’ case study, within a 
single structure for the analysis of the 
politics of organizational decision making. 
This we have done in figure 1. 
Links between persnectives 
A second important reason for including in 
our framework the elements of political 
context is that they provide a means of 
relating the political analysis with analyses 
of cognitive, cultural and group processes. 
Within the context of the case study we 
were not able to explore in detail the 
origins of the personal preferences we 
observed. In general, however, such 
personal preferences would appear to lie in 
the social context of individual develop- 
ment, and in particular in people’s 
education, training and work experiences. 
Drawing on the cognitive literature 
summarized above, it would also appear 
that the ways in which they become 
established and the force which they 
acquire may also have, psychological 
origins. The presence of unconscious 
cognitive simplifying processes may serve 
to weld together elements of experience 
into hardened preferences, and once 
established in the unconscious the 
interaction with archetypal elements may 
serve to further insulate them from 
contrary experiences and arguments. 
Cognitive processes such as these are not 
in themselves political, but nor can the 
processes of political negotiation be fully 
understood without reference to them. In 
particular the processes by which 
individual preferences are maintained must 
clearly be related closely to the processes 
by which they dominate, are changed, or 
are overridden within the political arena. 
The same is true of the processes by 
which group preferences are formed, as 
described by Schein (1985) and others. As 
groups develop the shared experience and 
bonds formed as part of the development 
process lead to a psychology in which 
loyalty to the group and to what it stands 
for becomes an important determinant of 
decision making. In a technical context 
the group’s technical preferences become 
fixed, and questions of group survival and 
prestige become every bit as important as 
those of technical merit, and often more 
so. What is important to the group is then 
reflected in their political attitudes, 
manoeuvres and negotiations. 
The same comments apply also to cultural 
preferences. According to Schein (1985), 
the effects of organizational cultures may 
be seen as development of those of groups, 
and within our case study this was 
certainly the case. The characteristic 
preferences of the R&D and engineering 
divisions were very much those of their 
founding groups. As the organizations grew 
these preferences were transmitted to 
newcomers (themselves selected and self - 
selected in accordance with the established 
cultures) through their leaders and 
customs, and through the reinforcement of 
supporting arguments. But whereas group 
preferences tended to be fairly specific, 
often tied to the project and technological 
concerns binding the groups together, the 
cultural preferences of the divisions were 
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more general. These were concerned, as 
one might expect, with social and 
professional values, but also with such 
matters as the role of private industry, 
the philosophy of design development, and 
the strategy for comparing and evaluating 
alternative options, all of which played 
key roles in the decision making process. 
As with the elements themselves, so with 
their relationships. For whereas a purely 
rational model of decision making might 
have little room for interpersonal or 
intergroup relations, political activity is of 
its nature concerned intimately with such 
things. In general, politics simply cannot 
exist without people, groups, preferences 
and relationships. Any analysis of it must 
consequently be related to the analysis of 
these things. 
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Table 1 
Pfeffer’s sources of power: Case studv examoles 
Resource provision 
Uncertainty coping 
Being irreplaceable 
Affecting decision premises, 
agenda or information input 
Consensus 
Political skills 
Other sources of power 
Control over organization 
Headquarters administration controlling budget alloca- 
tions. Engineering division responsible for fissile material 
production. 
Reactor safety groups. Engineering division responsible 
for large scale testing and development. 
Heads of R&D and engineering divisions. 
Committee chairmen. 
Tightly controlled engineering division compared with 
free debate and open differences in R&D division. 
Head of engineering division. Headquarters chairman of 
reactor policy committee. 
R&D division links with boundaries:government and 
industry. (Hambrick, 1981; Jemison 1981, 1984) 
Engineering division links with electricity authorities. 
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Table 2 
Pfeffer’s strategies and 
tactics 
Case studv examoles 
Selective use of objective 
criteria 
Pervasive at all levels, 
especially when deciding between alternative reactor 
types. 
Use of outside experts R&D division use of American information. 
Controlling agenda Used effectively by Engineering division director. 
Use of coalitions and R&D division coalition external constituencies 
building with headquarters, government, and the press. 
Cooptation Used by engineering division to divide R&D division. 
Attempted use by reactor project teams. 
Committees Headquarters use of inter-divisional committees. 
Other strategies and tactics 
IHendrv. 1988. Graham. 19861 
Use of effective power of 
veto or non-cooperation 
Main strategy of engineering 
division. 
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Figure 1 
Political units 
Preferences 
Relationships 
Sources of power 
Individuals Groups Divisions or 
departments 
Individual 
preferences 
Group 
preferences 
Cultural 
preferences 
Objective 
preferences 
Interpersonal Inter-group relationships 
relationships 
/I\ 
Formal Informal 
(committee) relationships 
relationships 
Being irreplaceable 
Political skills 
Affecting decision premises 
etc 
Consensus 
Uncertainty coping 
Resource provision 
Control over boundaries 
Strategies and tactics Selective use of objective criteria 
Use of outside experts 
Controlling agenda 
Use of coalitions and external 
constituencies 
Cooptation 
Use of committees 
Use of effective power of veto or 
non-cooperation 
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